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Are Police People Too?
AN EXAMINATION OF THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS
ACT’S “PRIVATE PERSON” STANDARD AS IT APPLIES
TO FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES
INTRODUCTION
Although the administration of criminal justice
historically resided with the various states,1 the scope of federal
law enforcement has grown immensely over the years.2 Today,
there are numerous federal investigative and law enforcement
agencies that are assigned significant duties and
responsibilities for the protection of the public.3 Unfortunately,
citizens are occasionally harmed by law enforcement officers in
the process of carrying out these duties.4 The law provides both
criminal and civil remedies to compensate citizens for these
harms, and, at the same time, provides a deterrent to
undesirable conduct.5 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)6 is
one such remedy. The Act provides a means of obtaining
compensation for harms caused by the negligent actions of
federal employees and for certain intentional torts.7 The FTCA
is necessary because the doctrine of sovereign immunity
1

THE FEDERALIST NO. 17, at 109 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry B. Dawson
ed., 1868) (“There is one transcendent advantage belonging to the province of the State
Governments, . . . the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice. . . . [The
administration of justice] being the immediate and visible guardian of life and property
. . . [has] its benefits and its terrors in constant activity before the public eye . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
2
H.R. REP. NO. 74-2034, at 2 (1936).
3
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (2006) (granting powers to agents of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation); 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (2009) (detailing general functions of the FBI).
4
See Sam Howe Verhovek, Border Patrol Is Criticized as Abusive, N.Y. TIMES,
May 21, 1998, at A14; Frank York, Doctor Seeks Justice After DEA’s Clinical Assault,
WORLDNETDAILY (Feb. 21, 2000, 1:00 AM), http://www.wnd.com/?pageId=4047.
5
See United States v. Westmoreland, 982 F. Supp. 376, 378 (S.D. W. Va.
1997) (discussing the exclusionary rule in the criminal context and pointing out the
availability of civil remedies).
6
28 U.S.C. §§ 2674, 2680 (2006).
7
See id. The federal government retains its immunity for certain intentional
torts, if they are committed by a federal employee who is not a law enforcement officer.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
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shields the government from suit without its consent, and
because the judicially created cause of action against individual
officers has significant shortcomings, namely that those
individuals may be judgment-proof.8
Because the FTCA was designed to address all tort
actions brought against the United States,9 it is ill-suited to
address the unique concerns that arise when the actions of law
enforcement officers are the subject of a suit. The primary
problem with the FTCA in these cases stems from its
requirement that the United States be liable “in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual.”10 This
private person standard is inappropriate because, in their
mission to uphold the law, these officers are obligated to put
themselves in situations that ordinary citizens are not.11
Recognizing this issue, courts in the past employed
different analyses to reach what seemed to be just results in
cases involving law enforcement.12 However, in recent years,
the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Olson,13 which
advocated a strict interpretation of the wording of the FTCA,14
has eliminated the flexibility that lower courts have used in
applying this statute. Since the FTCA is not well tailored to
these types of cases, and the Supreme Court has mandated a
plain meaning interpretation, courts have struggled to find
new approaches to the FTCA that follow the holding in Olson
while both allowing law enforcement agencies enough
discretion to carry out their duties and recognizing that these
officers are not similarly situated to private citizens. To date
they have not been successful. This note argues that the only
viable solution is for Congress to modify the FTCA by adding
language providing that, in suits concerning the actions of law
enforcement officers, the United States is liable in the same
manner and to the same extent as a state or municipality
under like circumstances.
8

See S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 2 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789,
2790. In today’s world of indemnification, however, this shortcoming is debatable. See
infra note 185 and accompanying text.
9
See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
10
28 U.S.C. § 2674.
11
See infra Part II.
12
See Hetzel v. United States, 43 F.3d 1500, 1505 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Crider v.
United States, 885 F.2d 294, 296 (5th Cir. 1989); Louie v. United States, 776 F.2d 819,
823 (9th Cir. 1985); Tomcsik v. United States, 720 F. Supp. 588, 591 (E.D. Mich. 1989),
aff’d, 917 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1990).
13
546 U.S. 43 (2005).
14
See id. at 44.
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Part I of this note provides a brief history of the FTCA
and the 1974 law enforcement amendment. Part II discusses
the differences between the obligations of law enforcement
officers and private citizens, and the problems that arise when
applying the private person standard of the FTCA to the
actions of law enforcement officers. Part III discusses the
recent case law in the area and details why the current judicial
approaches are unsatisfactory. Lastly, Part IV provides a
recommendation for how the FTCA could be modified by
Congress to better address the concerns that arise in law
enforcement cases.
I.

HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT

To fully explain the role that the FTCA plays in suits
brought against the United States, it is necessary to briefly
discuss the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The idea of
sovereign immunity was inherited from English law,15 under
which “[the King could] not be compelled to answer in his own
court . . . .”16 This concept enjoyed widespread acceptance in
America during the nation’s founding,17 and continues to be
applicable today.18 The practical effect of sovereign immunity is
that “the United States may not be sued without its consent.”19
Thus, the federal government can only be sued where it has
waived its right to this immunity, and then only under the
conditions that it prescribes.20 This doctrine places a
substantial, and sometimes insurmountable, burden on wouldbe plaintiffs.21 Despite this doctrine, throughout our nation’s
15

LESTER JAYSON & ROBERT LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS § 2.01 (2010).
16
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 415 n.6 (1979) (quoting 1 FREDERICK
POLLOCK & FREDERIC MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 518 (2d ed. 1899)).
17
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 318 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. & A. McLean
eds., 1788) (“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit
of an individual without its consent.”); see also Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the
Doctrine of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 439, 443 (2005) (statements
by James Madison and John Marshall).
18
United States v. Navajo Nation, 129 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (2009) (“The Federal
Government cannot be sued without its consent.”).
19
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983).
20
Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484, 501 (1967) (“It is well settled, of course, that
the Government is ordinarily immune from suit, and that it may define the conditions
under which it will permit such actions.”).
21
See Chelsea Sage Durkin, Comment, How Strong Stands the Federal Tort
Claims Act Wall? The Effect of the Good Samaritan and Negligence Per Se Doctrines on
Governmental Tort Liability, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 269, 270 (2007).
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history Congress has continually provided remedies for
individuals harmed by actions of the federal government and
its employees.22 The FTCA is the largest and most notable
waiver of sovereign immunity.23 This section briefly discusses
the remedies that were available prior to the FTCA, the
enactment of that statute, and the 1974 amendment.
A.

Remedies Prior to the Federal Tort Claims Act

Early in our nation’s history, the only remedy available
to citizens harmed by the actions of the federal government and
its actors was through the private bill system, where an
individual would lobby his or her representative in Congress to
pass
specific
legislation
granting
monetary
relief.24
Dissatisfaction with this process emerged as early as 1832,25
resulting in a number of different congressional acts that
provided remedies for a few specific harms.26 These remedies
were limited because they usually required the approval of the
executive branch that had caused the harm before any
compensation would be awarded.27 Moreover, the types of
scenarios that were compensable under these acts were very
limited—for example, damage to oyster growers arising from
dredging operations or other equipment while making river
and harbor improvements that were approved by Congress—
and only one of these bills actually addressed the area of
domestic law enforcement.28
The one act that was aimed at the law enforcement
function was passed in 1936 when Congress recognized the need
to compensate individuals harmed by agents of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI).29 This legislation came on the
heels of a series of incidents where civilians were harmed during
attempts to capture John Dillinger, a notorious bank robber in
22

See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 15, §§ 2.05, 2.10.
Id. § 1.03.
24
See id. § 2.01.
25
See Tort Claims: Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong. 49 (1942) (“As early as February 23, 1832, John
Quincy Adams wrote: ‘There ought to be no private business before Congress. . . . It is
judicial business, and legislative assemblies ought to have nothing to do with it.’”).
26
Id. § 2.05.
27
Id.
28
See id. Several of these bills did address damage caused by the armed
services, but those are distinct from domestic law enforcement. See id.
29
Act of Mar. 20, 1936, ch. 159, § 2603, 49 Stat. 1184, 1184-85 (1936) (current
version at 31 U.S.C. § 3724 (2006)).
23
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the 1930s.30 Congress, acknowledging the unique responsibilities
of these officers, stated that “[agents] must be free to act on the
spur of the moment and in the most reasonable manner which
the particular circumstances may afford.”31 Notwithstanding this
legislation, Congress remained inundated with private bills.32
The various remedies available simply did not cover the vast
majority of the scenarios where individuals could be harmed by
the actions of government actors.
B.

The Federal Tort Claims Act and the 1974 Amendment

In response to the continued influx of private bills,
Congress passed the FTCA as a part of the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946.33 The FTCA was broadly written so
that it would define the liability of the United States in all
circumstances where a federal employee, acting in the course of
his or her employment, was alleged to have committed a tort.34
It was not the first attempt at passing legislation to confer
jurisdiction on the courts for these suits.35 Similar bills had
been under consideration for years, but had failed to pass
because of disagreements within Congress.36 Congress hoped
that authorizing tort suits against the United States would
eliminate the need for private legislation, and that justice
would be better served by having a continually operating and
uniform process for addressing these claims.37
The result is that the FTCA grants federal courts
jurisdiction in any case brought against the United States where
injuries to persons or property are “caused by [a] negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government
30

There were two such incidents. One resulted in three civilians being shot
during a raid on the Little Bohemia resort in rural Wisconsin, and the second caused
minor injuries to civilians in Chicago. See ALSTON PURVIS & ALEX TRESNIOWSKI, THE
VENDETTA: FBI HERO MELVIN PURVIS’S WAR AGAINST CRIME, AND J. EDGAR HOOVER’S
WAR AGAINST HIM 91, 109-11 (2005) (describing the incident at Little Bohemia);
Dillinger Slain in Chicago; Shot Dead by Federal Men in Front of Movie Theatre, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 1934, at 1 (reporting on the shooting in Chicago).
31
H.R. REP. NO. 74-2034, at 2 (1936). This act is still in force for agencies
within the Department of Justice for harms that are not covered by the FTCA. See 31
U.S.C. § 3724 (2006).
32
See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 15, § 2.08.
33
Act of Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b),
2671-2680 (2006)).
34
See id.
35
H.R. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 2 (1945).
36
Id.
37
Id. at 2-3.
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while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where . . . a private person would be liable . . . in
accordance with the place where the act or omission occurred.”38
Moreover, “the United States shall be liable . . . in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances.”39 Thus, the FTCA performs both the
function of abrogating sovereign immunity and defining the
liability of the federal government.40 In both of these functions,
the FTCA defines the standard of liability for the United States
as equivalent to the liability of private persons under state law.41
The government does, however, retain defenses related to
judicial and legislative immunity, and “any other defenses to
which the United States is entitled.”42
The FTCA also includes several exceptions.43 One of those
is the intentional tort exception, which bars all suits against the
United States for claims “arising out of assault, battery, false
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference
with contract rights.”44 As originally enacted, this exception
applied to the actions of all federal employees.45
During the early 1970s, however, a series of incidents
involving agents of the newly created Office for Drug Abuse
Law Enforcement (DALE) prompted Congress to reconsider
this exception when intentional torts were committed by
federal law enforcement officers.46 Although there were several
38

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006).
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006).
40
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6 (1962) (“The Tort Claims Act was
designed primarily to remove the sovereign immunity of the United States from suits
in tort and, with certain specific exceptions, to render the Government liable in tort as
a private individual would be under like circumstances.”).
41
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674.
42
28 U.S.C. § 2674.
43
See HENRY COHEN & VANESSA K. BURROW, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AM.
LAW. DIV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 1-2 (2007)
[hereinafter CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS]. These exceptions include the Feres doctrine,
which disallows liability injuries by military personnel incident to service; the
discretionary function exception; the intentional tort exception; and an exception for an
employee exercising due care in the execution of a statute or regulation, regardless of
that statute’s validity. Id.
44
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970).
45
Id.
46
See S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 2 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789,
2791-2792; compare 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970), with 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2006) (The
latter was amended to state that “with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or
law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this
chapter and section 1346 (b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the
39
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reported incidents of abuse by DALE agents, the most notable
was a highly publicized series of “no knock” raids that occurred
in Collinsville, Illinois.47 On April 29, 1973, DALE agents broke
down the door of the Giglottos’ home in Collinsville, handcuffed
the couple, threatened them with violence, and ransacked their
house before realizing that they were at the wrong location.48
The agents quickly left the home, refusing to explain their
actions.49 All of this occurred within approximately thirty
minutes.50 The agents did not obtain a warrant or even properly
identify themselves to the couple.51 An almost identical scene
was replayed later that evening when DALE agents mistakenly
raided a second family’s home, also in Collinsville.52 As a result
of the intentional tort exception to the FTCA, these families
were left without a remedy under the Act because the agents
had acted intentionally rather than negligently.53 Congress
responded to this injustice by passing the 1974 amendment.54
Unlike the original FTCA, the 1974 amendment specifically
addressed the actions of law enforcement officers, but only in
relation to the intentional tort exception.55
The amendment provided that the United States could be
held liable for any claims “arising . . . out of assault, battery,
false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious
date of the enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution.”).
47
See S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 2.
48
Illinois: In the Name of the Law, TIME, May 14, 1973, available at
http://www.time.com/printout/0,8816,907220,00.html.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
See S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 2. It was noted that a violation of these
individuals’ constitutional rights was actionable against the individual agents under
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); however, that remedy was
considered insufficient because many federal agents are likely to be judgment proof. S.
REP. NO. 93-588, at 2.
54
Act to Amend Reorganization Plan Numbered 2 of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93253, § 2, 88 Stat. 50 (1974) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2006)). It is noteworthy
that Congress was discussing the need to provide compensation to victims of
constitutional torts, but did not desire to limit this amendment to include only those
actions that rose to the level of a constitutional violation. S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 3
(“[T]he Committee’s amendment should not be viewed as limited to constitutional tort
situations.”). Interestingly, the resulting statute expressly disallowed actions based on
constitutional torts because it subjected this amendment to the other provisions of the
FTCA, including the requirement that the United States be liable in accordance with
state law. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994) (“[T]he United States simply
has not rendered itself liable under § 1346(b) for constitutional tort claims.”).
55
See S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 2-3.

782

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:2

prosecution,” based on “the acts or omissions of federal
investigative or law enforcement officers.”56 By acknowledging
that the federal government should be liable for these
intentional torts when committed by law enforcement officers,
but not by other federal employees, Congress recognized that
this unique area of federal activity creates circumstances that
are different from the other areas of government action.
Nevertheless, it is clear that Congress’s intent was to
compensate victims of law enforcement abuses, but not for harm
caused during the valid execution of law enforcement authority.57
While the 1974 amendment took a much-needed step by
providing a remedy to victims of law enforcement abuse, it did
not change the overall standard of liability for the actions of
law enforcement officers. The result is that liability for the
actions of federal law enforcement officers is still determined
by the liability of a private person in like circumstances, just as
it would be in the case of any other government employee.58 The
remainder of this note discusses why the private person
standard is inappropriate for determining liability in the law
enforcement context, and the need for the FTCA to be modified
yet again to account for the unique role that law enforcement
plays in American society and the inherent differences between
law enforcement officers and private citizens.
II.

THE PRIVATE PARTY ANALOGUE AND POLICY ISSUES
RAISED BY ITS APPLICATION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT SUITS

The primary difficulty in applying the FTCA to cases
involving the actions of law enforcement officers is the private
person standard for determining the liability of the
government.59 This standard, which was not addressed by the
1974 amendment, is often implemented by using a private
party analogue (PPA).60 This process involves finding a private
party that would be in “like circumstances” and trying the case

56

28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
See Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 858 (9th Cir. 2007) (Fisher, J.,
concurring); S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 3.
58
Id.
59
See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006). As provided in the FTCA, the government is
liable “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances.” Id.
60
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4-10, United States v. Olson, 546 U.S.
43 (2005) (No. 04-759).
57

2011]

ARE POLICE PEOPLE TOO?

783

as if the federal actor was that private person.61 For example, a
doctor at a Veterans Affairs (VA) hospital would be compared
to a private doctor at a private hospital for the purposes of
assessing liability. Thus, if a state were to implement a shield
of liability for all publicly employed doctors, that shield would
not protect the doctor employed by the federal government
because a public employee is not a private person.62 Similarly, if
state employees were held to a higher standard than private
individuals, the United States would not be held to that
heightened standard.63 Normally, finding a comparable private
party for purposes of assessing liability is a fairly simple
endeavor;64 however, law enforcement activities present a
challenge because private citizens do not have the same
authority or responsibility to enforce laws as government
agents.65 This problem was well articulated by the Ninth
Circuit in Louie v. United States:
Questions as to the power and authority to arrest, to maintain
custody, and to lawfully restrict a person’s liberty, are unique to the
law enforcement function. Because private persons do not wield such
police powers, the inquiry into the government’s liability in this
situation must include an examination of the liability of state and
municipal entities under like circumstances.66

Recently, the appropriate PPA for the actions of law
enforcement was raised at the oral argument in Olson, where
the Justices questioned the government about what PPA would
apply to the actions of federal law enforcement officials.67 During
that discussion, Chief Justice Roberts offered the possibility that
“if it’s a police officer stopping somebody on a highway, it’s the
same as a private security guard stopping somebody.”68

61

Id. at 6-7.
See United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 44-45 (2005) (directly overruling
Aguilar v. United States, 920 F.2d 1475, 1477-78 (9th Cir. 1990), which held that the
United States could be shielded from liability by applying state law granting immunity
to state employees).
63
See, e.g., Ortiz v. U.S. Border Patrol, No. 99-2143, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6664,
at *3-4 (10th Cir. Apr. 11, 2000); Crider v. United States, 885 F.2d 294, 296 (5th Cir. 1989).
64
Durkin, supra note 21, at 273.
65
See Louie v. United States, 776 F.2d 819, 825 (9th Cir. 1985).
66
Id. (internal quotations omitted). The context of the Louie case made it an
interesting choice for the court to depart from the private person standard because
under the facts of the case the liability of municipal entities and private persons was
the same under Washington law. Id.
67
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 60, at 4-10.
68
See id. at 7.
62
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However, no private citizen is truly comparable to a law
enforcement officer,69 and it seems counterintuitive that the
unique characteristics of these officers would go without
consideration when determining the government’s liability for
their actions. Although citizens should be compensated for any
wrongful conduct of law enforcement officers, failing to
consider the differences between law enforcement officers and
private persons when determining liability could place an
undue burden on the agencies and officers that have an
affirmative duty to uphold the law.
Law enforcement officers are unique because of the
extensive training they receive and the fact that the
government places responsibilities on those officers that are
not applicable to private persons.70 As one commentator put it,
“There are many . . . differences between [law enforcement]
officers and civilians: officers cannot ‘call the police’ to avoid
using force; they often are not permitted to retreat; they are
trained and prepared to use force; and they routinely and
legitimately initiate contact that subsequently requires force to
be used.”71 These differences generally give rise to a more
deferential standard of liability.72
Of course, simply stating that it is logical to use
different standards to determine liability for law enforcement
officers and private citizens does not by itself explain why the
private person standard is undesirable. The problem is that
using a stricter standard of liability will create an incentive for
law enforcement officers to be overly cautious in discharging
their duties, which will result in a suboptimal level of law
enforcement.73 Recognizing this issue, one court stated, “If law
69

See Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L.
REV. 1119, 1182-83 (2008).
70
Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 74-2034, at 2 (1936) (“[FBI agents] must be free to
act on the spur of the moment and in the most reasonable manner which the particular
circumstances may afford, and they have been trained to this end.”); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 121 cmt. g (1977) (“The additional privilege is given because the
peace officer has a duty to the public to prevent crime and arrest criminals.”).
71
Harmon, supra note 69, at 1182.
72
See Lee v. United States, 570 F. Supp. 2d 142, 151-52 (D.D.C. 2008)
(“[W]hat may be reasonable for police officers may not always be reasonable for
ordinary citizens.”); Munoz v. City of Union City, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 521, 545 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2004) (“Appellants are correct . . . that police officers are given more deference in
judging the reasonableness of use of force than a private citizen would be.”).
73
This is especially true because the difference between desirable and
undesirable conduct in this instance is “vanishingly small.” William J. Stuntz, The Virtues
and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 444 (1997). Stuntz’s
article addresses the merits of the exclusionary rule; however, it is equally applicable in this
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enforcement officers are compelled to keep the peace at their
peril, without some discretion as to how to respond to an
apparent crisis, the peace will simply not be kept.”74 Still, at
least under the FTCA, these officers are not keeping the peace
“at their peril” in a strict sense because the officers themselves
are not liable under that statute.75 Nevertheless, assigning
liability to the government rather than to the officer will create
the same incentive, just at a higher level within the hierarchy
of the enforcement agency.76 It is unlikely that an officer would
be indifferent to the possibility that the government could be
held liable based on his or her conduct, either because of a
feeling of loyalty to the agency or out of concern that costing
the government money would have a negative effect on her
career. Indeed, “even where officers are indemnified, it is
reasonable to suppose that there are immense political costs (in
the sense of everyday workplace politics) associated with a
finding of liability and exposing the municipal employer to
budgetary pay-outs.”77
To avoid making law enforcement officers overlycautious in the course of their duties, the liability of the United
States should reflect these officers’ unique responsibilities and
training. This would ensure that the liability of the government
is better aligned with a standard of conduct that permits
officers to do their job effectively.78 Unfortunately, the private
context because both the exclusionary rule and civil liability provide remedies for the
violations of an acceptable standard of conduct in the context of law enforcement.
74
Arrington v. Moore, 358 A.2d 909, 916 (Md. App. 1976). For a discussion of
the risks of over-deterrence in the context of the Fourth Amendment, see Stuntz, supra
note 73, at 445-46.
75
See Act of Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(b), 2671-2780 (2006)).
76
See Stuntz, supra note 73, at 446 (discussing the effects of holding state
governments liable for damages as a result of Fourth Amendment violations).
77
Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent
Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 854-55 (2001).
78
See Act of May 2, 1792, § 9, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 265 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 564
(2006)) (recognizing that federal authority should be coextensive with state authority).
Also, although it is outside of the scope of this note, it is worth considering whether or
not we should use this distinction to further incentivize law enforcement officers to use
their skills in situations where a private person would be under no such obligation. See
Lisa McCabe, Note, Police Officers’ Duty to Rescue or Aid: Are They the Only Good
Samaritans?, 72 CAL. L. REV. 661, 681 (1984) (arguing that law enforcement should be
held to a higher duty to rescue than ordinary citizens). Some jurisdictions already
differentiate between private persons and local law enforcement officials in
determining a duty to rescue. See Lee v. State, 490 P.2d 1206, 1209-10 (Ala. 1971),
rev’d on other grounds, Monroe v. City Council for City of Anchorage, 545 P.2d 165
(Ala. 1976). However, the additional duties placed on local law enforcement officers do
not currently apply to federal officers. See Ortiz v. U.S. Border Patrol, No. 99-2143,

786

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:2

party standard of the FTCA, as currently interpreted, makes it
impossible to take these factors into account.
III.

RECENT CASES DEALING WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS AND THE FTCA

Recognizing that law enforcement activities are not well
suited to the private person standard, several courts, led by the
Ninth Circuit, had previously rejected the PPA approach in
circumstances involving federal law enforcement officers.79 The
Ninth Circuit also set the high water mark for this approach by
allowing state immunity statutes to shield the federal
government from liability in certain cases.80 By contrast, the
Fifth, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits refused to apply statutory
immunity to the federal government, but they still applied
general law enforcement privileges and used the more
deferential standards of reasonableness that applied to local
officers when determining negligent behavior.81 However, in
2005, the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Olson
rejected the proposition that the private party requirement of
the FTCA can be set aside, even for actions that are uniquely
governmental.82 This holding has resulted in uncertainty as to
what standard should apply in law enforcement cases.83 At least
four different judicial approaches have arisen since Olson, none
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6664, at *3-4 (10th Cir. Apr. 11, 2000) (holding that the United
States was protected from liability by the local “Good Samaritan” statute, even though
local law enforcement officers would be subject to a separate test to determine if they
had a duty to render aid).
79
See Hetzel v. United States, 43 F.3d 1500, 1503-04 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Crider
v. United States, 885 F.2d 294, 296 (5th Cir. 1989); Louie v. United States, 776 F.2d
819, 825 (9th Cir. 1985); Tomcsik v. United States, 720 F. Supp. 588, 591 (E.D. Mich.
1989), aff’d, 917 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1990).
80
See Cimo v. INS, 16 F.3d 1039, 1041 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing City of
Sacramento v. Superior Court, 182 Cal. Rptr. 443, 449 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)), abrogated
by United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43 (2005); Aguilar v. United States, 920 F.2d 1475,
1476 (9th Cir. 1990), abrogated by Olson, 546 U.S. 43.
81
See Hetzel, 43 F.3d at 1503-04; Crider, 885 F.2d at 296; Tomcsik, 720 F.
Supp. at 591. In some cases the distinction between a statute granting immunity and a
statute defining a standard of care is blurry at best. See Hetzel, 43 F.3d at 1506
(Williams, J., concurring). If a statute defines the extent of law enforcement’s immunity
according to a specific standard of conduct, that statute can be serving a dual purpose. Id.
Moreover, “[a]nytime a court raises the standard of care that defines a legal duty that is
owed . . . it implicitly immunizes a part of the conduct that otherwise would be considered
tortious and actionable.” Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600, 604 (N.J. 1994).
82
Olson, 546 U.S. at 45.
83
See Cantanho v. United States, No. CV 06-2496, 2009 WL 1160256, at *8-9
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2009) (discussing the uncertainty in the wake of Olson as to
whether law enforcement privileges apply to suits under the FTCA).

2011]

ARE POLICE PEOPLE TOO?

787

of which are entirely satisfactory.84 This section provides a
discussion of the Olson decision, outlines the four
interpretations of the FTCA since Olson, and explains why
none of those approaches is satisfactory.
A.

United States v. Olson

In Olson, the Supreme Court directly overruled the
Ninth Circuit’s holding that, where the conduct that gave rise
to the suit was uniquely governmental, courts should look to
the liability of state and municipal entities to assess the
liability of the federal government.85 The claim in Olson
involved allegations that a federal mine inspector was
negligent, and that his negligence led to the plaintiff suffering
injuries when a mine he was working in collapsed.86 The
plaintiff alleged that the inspector failed to follow the
guidelines of the Mine Safety and Health Administration
(MSHA) by failing to properly evaluate several complaints that
were filed.87 As a result, the weaknesses in the mine were not
discovered and the plaintiff was still in the mine when the
ceiling collapsed.88 Approximately nine tons of earth fell where
he was working.89 The Ninth Circuit looked to Arizona case law,
under which state mine inspectors could be held liable in
similar circumstances.90
On appeal, the Supreme Court first addressed the circuit
court’s decision to use state employees as the appropriate
analogue to determine liability in this case.91 The Court rejected
this comparison as inconsistent with the text of the FTCA.92
Specifically, it held that the lower court had “read something
into the act that is not there.”93 Rather, the court stated that the
words of the FTCA “mean what they say”: the United States is
to be liable “to the same extent as a private individual.”94
84

See infra Part III.B.
Olson, 546 U.S. at 45.
86
Id.
87
Olson v. United States, 362 F.3d 1236, 1238-39 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated,
546 U.S. 43, remanded to 433 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2006).
88
Id. at 1238.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 1240.
91
Olson, 546 U.S. at 45-46.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 44 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2674).
85
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Moreover, it held that this private person standard of liability
applies regardless of whether the analogy to a municipal entity
is being used to escape or to create liability.95
Next, the court addressed the method of determining
what private individual would provide an appropriate
comparison.96 Justice Breyer stated that the words of the FTCA
require that the liability of the federal government be based on
the liability of private persons in “like circumstances,” not the
same circumstances.97 In this case, although no private persons
in the state were in the same circumstances because there were
no private mine inspectors, the court should have looked to
private parties that conduct other types of safety inspections
because those circumstances were sufficiently similar to the
mine inspectors.98
It is important to note that Olson did not involve law
enforcement activity; however, it is still important in that
context because of its unequivocal holding that the FTCA
should be interpreted according to the plain language of the
statute.99 In light of this decision it is clearly inappropriate to
make explicit exceptions to the PPA, even if the conduct at
issue has no realistically comparable analogue in the private
sector. More than that, because Olson offers no escape
whatsoever from the private person standard, it can also be
read to undermine the application of any law enforcement
privilege given to federal agents, at least for the purposes of
determining the government’s civil liability.100 This decision has
featured prominently in recent cases brought based on the
actions of federal law enforcement officers.
B.

Recent Judicial Interpretations

In the years since Olson, courts have recognized that
the Supreme Court has overruled precedent that used
comparisons to local law enforcement to determine the federal
government’s liability,101 and in response have fashioned their
own interpretations of the proper way to apply Olson and the
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

See id. at 46.
Id. at 46-47.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 44.
See infra Part III.B.2.
See Lee v. United States, 570 F. Supp. 2d 142, 148-50 (D.D.C. 2008).
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FTCA in the context of federal law enforcement. Before
discussing possible solutions to the problems that arise under
the private person standard of liability in this context, it is
necessary to analyze the current judicial solutions to see if any
of them adequately address those concerns. Unfortunately,
none of them offers a truly effective solution.102 Each approach
is discussed in turn.
1. The True “Private Person Standard” Interpretation
Judge Tashima, in the case of Tekle v. United States,103
offered the first approach to the private person standard of
liability under Olson. His approach was that, under the plain
meaning interpretation of the FTCA, the federal government
should be subject to exactly the same standard of liability as a
private person, which would include being barred from
asserting any privileges that are unique to law enforcement.104
The claims in Tekle were based on the actions of
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agents who were executing an
arrest warrant.105 The agents attempted to execute the warrant
when the suspects’ children were not home, but one of the
children was in fact present during the arrest.106 The child
exited the house before the arrest began and was handcuffed
and held at gunpoint while the arrest was completed.107 The
child was allegedly subjected to abusive treatment in the form

102

Although the cases below address the private person requirement in the
context of negligence and the application of privileges in response to intentional torts,
the issue arises in any situation where the law deals with law enforcement officials. An
example of another scenario is where a police officer uses force during an arrest where
there has been some physical threat. This issue was discussed, but not decided, in a
recent case. See Cantanho v. United States, No. CV 06-2496, 2009 WL 1160256, at *8
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2009) (“A police officer is entitled to the even greater use of force
than might be in the same circumstances required for self defense.” (quoting Brown v.
Ransweiler, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 801 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted))). In Cantanho, the result was the same under either standard based on the
facts of the case, making it unnecessary for the court to determine which standard
applied under the FTCA. Id. at *9.
103
511 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2007).
104
See id. at 850-54. Although the discussion of this interpretation focuses
primarily on the issues that arise under the standard of citizen’s arrest, it is important
to note that this approach also suffers from the same problems as the following
interpretation when it comes to claims of negligence. See infra Part III.B.3.
105
Tekle, 511 F.3d at 842.
106
Id.
107
See id. at 843.
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of abusive comments, spitting on his shoes, and pulling him off
the ground by the handcuffs.108
Judge Tashima stated that, although law enforcement
officers are generally given greater authorization than ordinary
citizens in deciding when to make an arrest,109 the government
was not entitled to that privilege under a strict interpretation of
the FTCA.110 The facts alleged in Tekle seem egregious enough to
warrant compensation under any standard; however, the use of
a citizen’s arrest statute to determine the federal government’s
liability could create issues in other scenarios. As Tekle pointed
out, many citizen’s arrest statutes are more limited than the
authority granted to law enforcement officers.111 For example, the
citizen’s arrest statute in California only authorizes an arrest
without a warrant if a misdemeanor has been witnessed, where
the individual has actually committed a felony, or where a felony
has actually taken place and the arrestor has reason to believe
that the individual being arrested was responsible for that
felony.112 Therefore, it follows that if a person is arrested without
a warrant, even with probable cause, the arrestor could be held
liable if no felony was actually committed.113 It is possible to
imagine a scenario where a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
agent observes a suspect carrying a bag of white powder out of a
building and chooses to detain that person. If the white powder
turned out to be cocaine or some other drug then the detention of
that person would be authorized for peace officers and citizens
alike.114 If, however, the powder turned out to be something
harmless, then the arrest would not be protected by the citizen’s
arrest privilege since no misdemeanor was committed in the

108

See id.
See id. at 851, 854 (stating that although the standard applicable to a
citizen’s arrest has been considered inappropriate for application to law enforcement,
the holding in Olson requires that the court apply that standard); see also Tomlin v.
State, 869 P.2d 334, 338 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (stating that, in Oklahoma, a citizen’s
right to make an arrest is more narrow than that of a peace officer).
110
Tekle, 511 F.3d at 851, 854.
111
See id. at 854.
112
CAL. PENAL CODE § 837 (West 2009).
113
This corresponds to the common law rule. See United States v. Hillsman,
522 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1975); Allen v. Lopinsky, 94 S.E. 369 (W. Va. 1917); Napier v.
Sheridan, 547 P.2d 1399 (Or. Ct. App. 1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 119
cmt. i at 197 (1965). But see Burton v. McNeill, 13 S.E. 10 (S.C. 1941); Stevenson v.
State, 413 A.2d 1340 (Md. 1980).
114
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 837. The possession of cocaine would be an actual
felony, and, at least for the purposes of this example, the visual observation would
provide the requisite probable cause.
109
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presence of the agent and no felony was actually committed.115
The agent would be personally protected from civil liability116 and
criminal charges117 by the applicable statute, but under Judge
Tashima’s interpretation of the FTCA, that protection would not
be extended to the United States in a corresponding false
imprisonment claim.118 Although it seems absurd that the
government would be liable in this scenario, it is a possibility
under this approach to the FTCA.119 Even though the officers
retain a level of personal immunity, liability on the part of the
government could still lead to officers being overly cautious,
thereby making them less effective in carrying out their duties.120
2. The “Privileges Expressly Granted by Federal
Statute” Interpretation
The next interpretation of the private person
requirement came from Judge Fisher’s concurring opinion in
Tekle.121 Judge Fisher opined that even after the decision in
Olson, the United States was entitled to assert law
enforcement privileges granted by federal statute in actions

115

As noted previously, not all states require that a felony actually be
committed. See, e.g., Stevenson, 413 A.2d 1340; Burton, 13 S.E. 10. However, in many
jurisdictions the felony requirement is still in place. See Hillsman, 522 F.2d 454; Allen,
945 S.E. 369; Napier, 547 P.2d 1399. Moreover, liability could arise if the detention was
categorized as an arrest or as an investigative (Terry) stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968), because in many jurisdictions private citizens have no special authority to
make a Terry stop unless a citizen’s arrest would also be justified. See United States v.
Sealed Juvenile 1, 255 F.3d 213, 219 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Atwell, 470 F.
Supp. 2d 554, 564-65 (D. Md. 2007); Commonwealth v. Gullick, 435 N.E.2d 348, 351
(Mass. 1982); Garner v. State, 779 S.W.2d 498, 501 (Tex. App. 1989).
116
See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (2006).
117
In this hypothetical that statute would be 21 U.S.C. § 878(a)(3) (2006).
118
As another commentator noted, the idea that the statutory privilege
granted to these agents applies to them individually but not to the government seems
unusual, to say the least. See Durkin, supra note 21, at 282-83. It is worth pointing out,
however, that although this is undesirable, it is not entirely irrational. An argument
could be made that individuals who are wrongly arrested should receive some
compensation, but if that compensation came from the agents themselves it would be a
great disincentive to becoming a law enforcement officer.
119
Although it is not mentioned in the Tekle opinion, the government could
argue that the decision to detain the plaintiff fell under the discretionary function
exception of the FTCA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006). This argument has enjoyed
some success in the courts. See Shuler v. United States, 531 F.3d 930, 934-35 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (decision when to arrest a suspect is a discretionary function).
120
See supra Part II.
121
Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 857-58 (9th Cir. 2007) (Fisher, J.,
concurring).

792

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:2

under the FTCA.122 He reasoned that this approach was
necessary to avoid conflicts between statutes that grant law
enforcement privileges to federal agents, in this case 26 U.S.C.
§ 7608, and the FTCA.123 He also noted that, because the
Supreme Court did not expressly foreclose the use of law
enforcement privileges in FTCA cases, to disallow the
application of these privileges was unnecessary and would force
courts to reach absurd results.124
This argument is attractive because it effectively
harmonizes two statutes that seem to be in conflict under the
purely private person standard.125 The conflict arises because 26
U.S.C. § 7608 authorizes a privilege, and the FTCA, at least
under a strict interpretation, would deny the same privilege in
proceedings to determine the government’s liability.
Unfortunately, the limitations of this approach arise out
of its reasoning. Because the argument states that the private
person requirement should be limited to avoid a conflict of
statutes, it is logical that where the conflict between statutes
ends, the strict PPA should go back into effect. Hence, even
though the federal statute cited by Judge Fisher provides IRS
agents with the privilege to undertake arrests and searches,
thereby trumping the use of a citizen’s arrest statute to
determine the false imprisonment claim, there is no statutory
privilege that addresses the appropriate standard for negligence
actions or defines the use of force during an arrest.126 Without
additional statutory privilege, there is no justification for courts
to treat federal agents any differently than how they would treat
122

Id. at 857. The district court chose to apply this approach to the private
person requirement on remand. See Tekle v. United States, No. CV 01-3894-RSWL,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39091, at *26-27 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2009).
123
Tekle, 511 F.3d at 857 (Fisher, J., concurring).
124
Id. at 858. It is not entirely clear that there is a conflict between the
privileges afforded to IRS agents in the statute cited by the court, 26 U.S.C. § 7608(a)(2)
(2006), and the privileges afforded to private persons generally. That statute authorizes
agents to “execute and serve search warrants and arrest warrants.” 26 U.S.C.
§ 7608(a)(2). A similar privilege has been recognized as applicable to private persons. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 122, 213 (1977) (citing privileges to arrest or to
enter land pursuant to a court order). The conflict between the citizen’s arrest statute and
the privilege afforded to the IRS agents under federal statute arises only when agents are
making an arrest based on probable cause that the suspect has committed a felony.
Compare 26 U.S.C. § 7608(a)(3), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 834 (West 2009).
125
Tekle, 511 F.3d at 857-58 (Fisher, J., concurring) (citing California ex rel.
Sacramento Metro. Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. United States, 215 F.3d 1005, 1012 (9th
Cir. 2000)).
126
See 26 U.S.C. § 7608 (2006). Statutes granting privileges to other law
enforcement agencies are similar. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 878 (2006) (DEA); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3052 (2006) (FBI).
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a private citizen in these other claims.127 So while this
interpretation takes the court part of the way toward handling
the problems created by the private person requirement of the
FTCA, it still falls short in how it addresses certain scenarios.
These deficiencies could still act to impair the enforcement of
laws and indirectly impinge on executive policy.
This problem can be seen in Sauceda v. United States,
which is currently being litigated in the District of Arizona.128 In
that case, the plaintiffs were harmed when a Border Patrol
agent allegedly deployed a controlled tire deflation device
(CTDD) while attempting to apprehend a vehicle containing a
number of illegal immigrants.129 The plaintiff brought a claim
based on negligence and suggested that an appropriate PPA
would either be a person throwing a water balloon at a car,
which seems like a particularly poor analogy, or, perhaps more
appropriately, a shopkeeper attempting to detain someone
suspected of shoplifting.130 The second option seems much more
fitting because it involves a party attempting to stop an
individual suspected of committing a crime on his or her
premises. In addition, many corporations and retailers have
security guards on their grounds.131
Under Judge Fisher’s approach, the United States
would be entitled to assert privileges that have been expressly
granted by statute; however, there is no federal statute that
grants the government greater deference in negligence
actions.132 Without a statute granting this additional privilege,
the private person standard would apply. Thus, for a
negligence claim, the court must use analogies to water balloon
throwers, private security guards, and shopkeepers to
determine whether or not the alleged deployment of the CTDD
127

The result would seem to be similar to the Second Circuit’s approach in an
earlier case, where the court evaluated the government’s liability as it would a private
“person having legal authority to participate in the . . . raid at issue.” Castro v. United
States, 34 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1994).
128
Sauceda v. United States, No. CV-07-2267-PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 3756703
(D. Ariz. Nov. 5, 2009).
129
Defendant’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss and
Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Sauceda v. United States, No. CV-07-2267-PHXDGC (D. Ariz. Sept. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Defendant’s Reply Memorandum]. It was
contested whether the agent deployed the CTDD or simply dropped it while trying to
avoid being hit by the oncoming vehicle. Id.
130
Id. at 8.
131
Moreover, this analogy seems to be in keeping with the opinion of Chief
Justice Roberts as expressed during the oral argument for Olson. See Transcript of
Oral Argument, supra note 60, at 7.
132
Westlaw search conducted by author on Nov. 22, 2010.
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was reasonable. Under any of these analogies, the United
States would almost surely be held liable. It is difficult to
imagine any court sanctioning the use of a CTDD by a private
party under any circumstances.133 Even under the
shopkeeper/security guard analogy, which would certainly be
more flexible, it is hard to conceive of a scenario where those
individuals would be allowed to use a CTDD without incurring
liability.134 Just the idea of a retail security guard throwing stop
sticks under the car of a suspected thief seems outlandish. On
the other hand, law enforcement agents are clearly permitted
to use these instruments in the appropriate circumstances,135
and it seems entirely natural, and even desirable, for them to
do so. By analogizing to a private person, that is, a private
security guard, federal agents are more limited than local law
enforcement officers in the methods available to them in
apprehending suspects, at least without incurring liability on
behalf of the government. As discussed above, this has
potentially serious drawbacks for the enforcement of agencies’
responsibilities.136 Thus, this interpretation is ultimately
insufficient to fully address the private person problem.

133

This problem arises under multiple tort claims. For example, a plaintiff
could argue, as did the plaintiff in Sauceda, that the deployment of the CTDD was
negligent under the circumstances. Sauceda, 2009 WL 3756703, at *5. A plaintiff could
also argue that the agent committed the intentional tort of assault or battery by using
the CTDD. Although private citizens are allowed to use some force in effecting an
arrest without incurring liability for battery or other intentional torts, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 119, 132 (1977), it still seems unlikely that a
court would allow citizens to use such devices. As a general rule, private persons do not
have the training or the experience to know how and when to use these types of tools.
See supra Part II.
134
Defendant’s Reply Memorandum, supra note 129, at 8-9. In Sauceda, this
argument was made by the government, but ultimately proved unpersuasive. Sauceda,
2009 WL 3756703, at *5. Judge Campbell stated that the question at issue was
whether or not this particular incident constituted negligence, not whether or not every
deployment of a CTDD would be negligence under a purely private person standard. Id.
It is also of interest here that Judge Campbell endorses the opinion of Judge Fisher
that law enforcement privileges should be available to federal agents; however, the
government argued no such privilege. Id. Moreover, in this particular instance the
regulations governing the use of force by Border Patrol agents do not offer much
guidance. 8 C.F.R. § 287.8 (2008).
135
See United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 886-89 (9th Cir. 2009);
Estate of Curran v. N.C. Dep’t of Crime Control & Public Safety, No. COA08-305, 2009
WL 131178, at *5 (N.C. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2009). Although the facts in Guzman-Padilla
also concern agents of the Border Patrol, the facts are different than those in Sauceda
because the latter dealt with an arrest whereas the former was not considered an
arrest but merely a border stop. Compare Sauceda, 2009 WL 3756703, at *4, with
Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d at 885-86.
136
See supra Part II.
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Beyond the concerns expressed above, applying the
private person requirement to law enforcement activity could
also undermine the “discretionary function” exception to the
FTCA. “The discretionary function exception is the most
significant exception to government liability that is explicitly
provided for in the FTCA.”137 It disallows claims “based upon
the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function . . . .”138 The exception is based
largely on separation of powers concerns.139
Before granting immunity under the discretionary
function exception, a court must determine what conduct the
claim is based upon and if that conduct is protected by the
exception.140 The question of whether or not the conduct is
discretionary involves a two-part test: (1) does the conduct
involve a choice, rather than a mandated action, and (2) is it
the kind of discretion that Congress intended.141 This exception
has significant practical effects on suits against the United
States, because if the government can successfully argue that
the actions taken by a law enforcement official were actually
caused by a policy decision made at a planning level, then the
discretionary exception will apply.142 However, that argument is
often difficult to apply to the actions of federal agents carrying
out a spur-of-the-moment search or arrest.143 Moreover, the
discretionary function exception does not rule out the
possibility that a decision that falls within the discretionary
function could be carried out negligently. For example, if the
FBI chose to use tear gas as part of an operation, that decision
would be considered within the discretionary function
exception.144 On the other hand, the discretionary function
would not bar a claim that the FBI agents deployed the tear
137

CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 9.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006).
139
Richard H. Seamon, Causation and the Discretionary Function Exception to
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 691, 703 (1997).
140
Id. at 696.
141
Id. at 704-05.
142
See id. at 715-17.
143
See Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1296-97 (5th Cir. 1987)
(finding that if the discretionary function were drawn too broadly it would prevent
government liability for actions like the Collinsville raids that Congress clearly
intended to be compensable); Morales v. United States, 961 F. Supp. 633, 636 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (“[T]o expand the exception to encompass any government act or decision that
simply involved the exercise of discretion would entirely eviscerate, and contradict, the
Government’s waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA.”).
144
Andrade v. Chojnacki, 65 F. Supp. 2d 431, 466 (W.D. Tex. 1999).
138
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gas in a negligent manner.145 This can be a somewhat narrow
distinction, and it is possible that imposing a private person
standard on the government in a case like Sauceda could
violate the spirit of the discretionary function exception, even if
it only attacks the individual officer’s actions in carrying out
that policy decision. This argument closely parallels the one
above, but with emphasis on the policy concerns expressed by
the discretionary function exception.
In Sauceda, the Border Patrol had made the policy
decision to allow its officers to use CTDD devices.146 Presumably,
the Border Patrol weighed the policy benefits of enforcing its
duties against the potential dangers of using CTDD devices and
made a decision that they were appropriate for use, at least
under certain conditions. That decision is analogous to a decision
by the FBI to use tear gas as part of a planned raid, and it is
exactly the type of discretion that Congress intended to protect
by including the discretionary function exception.147 But the
question presented in Sauceda was not whether a CTDD was
appropriate for use generally, but rather whether the Border
Patrol agent had used the device negligently in this one
instance.148 When framed this way, the discretionary function
exception would not apply because the court is only asking if the
agent was negligent in the particular way he used the CTDD
device.149 However, if the United States is liable to the same
extent as a private person, then almost any use of a CTDD
would expose the government to potential liability.150 It is at this
point that the line between liability based on a policy decision
and liability based on negligent execution begins to blur. If there
is virtually no scenario where a CTDD can be used without
incurring liability, then any distinction between assigning
liability to the policy versus the execution is not much more than
semantics. If all, or substantially all, uses of CTDDs by Border
Patrol agents trigger liability, then the sheer threat of that

145

Id. at 467.
See Defendant’s Reply Memorandum, supra note 129, at 9.
147
See Andrade, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 466.
148
See Sauceda v. United States, No. CV-07-2267-PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 3756703,
at *5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 5, 2009).
149
See Andrade, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
150
See infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text. However, the government is
still free to assert positive defenses to escape liability. See Sauceda, 2009 WL 3756703,
at *5 (asserting self-defense).
146
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liability will undermine the policy decision by discouraging them
from ever being used.151
Thus, although this approach does avoid some of the
problems that are inherent in the previous interpretation, it
does not solve the private person problem in its entirety.
3. The “Privileges Granted by State Law” Interpretation
The next interpretation, also offered by Judge Fisher,
posits that state law, in this particular case a state statute, can
provide privileges to federal law enforcement agents that would
apply in cases brought under the FTCA.152 To support this
proposition, he cited California Penal Code § 847(b),153 which
explicitly provides privileges to federal law enforcement officers
that are not available to private citizens.154 This analysis relies
on the fact that liability under the FTCA is determined under
the law of the state.155 This solution is unacceptable for two
reasons. It allows the states to usurp Congress’s authority to
define the liability of the United States, and it has the
potential to create wide variations in the standards to which
federal agents are held in each state.
The first problem with this approach is that it lets the
states, rather than Congress, decide the extent to which the
United States is liable. While it is true that Congress chose to
determine the liability of the United States based on the law of
151

This argument was rejected by the court on summary judgment. Sauceda,
2009 WL 3756703, at *3, *5. Unfortunately, the bulk of the decision addressing the
discretionary function exception of the FTCA is unavailable because it was filed under
seal. Id. at *3.
152
See Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 858-59 (9th Cir. 2007) (Fisher, J.,
concurring).
153
CAL. PENAL CODE § 847(b) (West 2009) provides, in relevant part:
There shall be no civil liability on the part of, and no cause of action shall
arise against, any peace officer or federal criminal investigator or law
enforcement officer described in subdivision (a) or (d) of Section 830.8, acting
within the scope of his or her authority, for false arrest or false imprisonment
arising out of any arrest under any of the following circumstances:
(1) The arrest was lawful, or the peace officer, at the time of the arrest, had
reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful.
(2) The arrest was made pursuant to a charge made, upon reasonable cause,
of the commission of a felony by the person to be arrested.
154

Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 847(b) (West 2009), with CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 834 (West 2009).
155
See Tekle, 511 F.3d at 858 (Fisher, J., concurring). At least one other
circuit has taken the same stance. See Villafranca v. United States, 587 F.3d 257, 26264 (5th Cir. 2009).
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the state in which the act occurred,156 and that has been
interpreted to include the choice of laws rules of that state,157
Congress also limited the application of state law by requiring
that liability be determined according to the law that would
apply to “a private individual under like circumstances.”158 If
the words of the FTCA “mean what they say,”159 then it should
not matter which statutes or case law the individual states
create to govern the conduct of federal agents, because liability
is to be assessed according to “the state-law liability of private
entities, not . . . that of public entities.”160
Moreover, it is quite likely that in some situations
Congress intended that the United States be held liable to an
extent different from that of state law enforcement officers, at
least for some purposes. For example, suppose that a state
chose to incorporate federal officers into its definition of peace
officers or law enforcement officers. In that event, federal
agents would be entitled to receive all of the privileges of local
officers within the state; however, if the same state chose to
place an affirmative duty to rescue on its law enforcement
officers, then the federal government could be held liable under
the same duty to rescue,161 or otherwise be excluded from the
protections of a “Good Samaritan” statute because of their
status as federal agents.162 While it may be desirable for federal
agents to have a duty to rescue from a public policy
perspective,163 it should be Congress, rather than state
legislatures, that subjects the United States to such a duty.
The second problem is that the privileges, and
potentially affirmative duties, applicable to the federal
government would be subject to wide variation because they
would come from the law of each individual state. Some states
156

FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994) (“[W]e have consistently held that
§ 1346(b)’s reference to the ‘law of the place’ means law of the State—the source of
substantive liability under the FTCA.”).
157
Rhoden v. United States, 55 F.3d 428, 431 (9th Cir. 1995).
158
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006).
159
United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 44 (2005).
160
Id. at 46 (citing Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64 (1955)).
161
In some states, the fact that federal law enforcement officers have a
specific area of jurisdiction might exempt them from liability because they would not be
considered “general law enforcement officials.” Flynn v. United States, 902 F.2d 1524,
1528-29 (10th Cir. 1990).
162
Currently, the federal government is protected from liability by the private
person requirement in these scenarios. See Ortiz v. U.S. Border Patrol, No. 99-2143,
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6664, at *3-4, *8-9 (10th Cir. Apr. 11, 2000); Crider v. United
States, 885 F.2d 294, 296 (5th Cir. 1989).
163
See McCabe, supra note 78, at 675.
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might provide some limited privileges to federal agents, some
might grant full privileges but also impose positive duties, and
others might not enact statutory protections for federal law
enforcement at all. The potential for such wide inconsistencies
in the government’s liability is clearly problematic. There
would have to be extensive training on what is and is not
acceptable in each state. However, even if there was little
variation by state, the liability of the United States should be
determined by Congress, not by state courts and legislatures.164
Thus, the incorporation of privilege granted to federal law
enforcement via state statute is not an optimal solution.165
4. The “Hybrid” or “Reasonable Person/Reasonable
Police Officer” Interpretation
The final approach to determining the government’s
liability under the private person standard was put forward in
Lee v. United States.166 In Lee, the United States was sued after
the capitol police initiated a high-speed chase that ultimately
resulted in an accident that killed one of the passengers in the

164

This is not to say that the laws of each individual state have no bearing
whatsoever on the liability of the United States. In fact, they have a significant effect
because liability under the FTCA is based on the law of the state in which the wrongful
act occurs. See Tri-State Hosp. Supply Corp. v. United States, 341 F.3d 571, 582 (D.C.
Cir. 2003). There is, however, a difference between state courts and legislators defining
liability for actions of the general population of “private persons,” and determining the
level of liability that is applicable specifically to federal actors. See Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 60, at 9-13. This difficulty was explained away in Villafranca v.
United States, by characterizing a privilege as something that “protects the actor from
a finding of tortious conduct” as opposed to something that “affects liability.” 587 F.3d
257, 263 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Garza v. United States, 881 F. Supp. 1103, 1106 (S.D.
Tex. 1995)). This distinction is more form than function.
165
A similar approach has been endorsed by a fellow commentator. See
Durkin, supra note 21, at 282-83. In that note, the author argues that “if a state were
to adopt a federal standard, it would be appropriate to look to the federal law to
determine the question of duty.” Id. This was discussed at the oral argument in Olson,
where it was admitted that adoption of the federal standard would get you “most of the
way home in getting [FTCA] . . . liability.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 60,
at 10. However, this approach would fail to be in keeping with Olson because, as the
author acknowledges, it would still require a “detour from the strict language of
§ 2674.” Durkin, supra note 21, at 282-83. Furthermore, although there are federal
standards for some actions of law enforcement, such as when an arrest is valid, there
are a myriad of circumstances in which no statute or regulation currently exists. The
use of a “federal standard” in these cases would be problematic because the FTCA was
designed to avoid the creation of a common law of torts at the federal level. See Devlin
v. United States, 352 F.3d 525, 532 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he FTCA’s basic thrust was
decidedly not to create a federal common law of torts, but . . . to tie the government’s
liability . . . to the disparate and always evolving tort law of the several states.”).
166
See Lee v. United States, 570 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D.D.C. 2008).
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fleeing vehicle.167 The court looked to the law that applied to
private persons to determine the existence of a duty, but
evaluated whether that duty was breached based on the
standard of care for local police officers in similar
circumstances.168 The result is a sort of hybrid of private person
liability and the standard for liability that would be applicable
to local police.
First, the court determined that the federal agents
involved in this pursuit owed the same general duty of care
that every private individual driving in the District of
Columbia owes to other drivers.169 While it acknowledged that
chasing a suspect is clearly different from a citizen taking an
everyday drive, the court stated that it was “bound[, by Olson,]
to consider the circumstances as if the United States were a
private individual.”170 The court also stated that the United
States would be held to a pure negligence standard,171 rather
than the gross negligence standard that would normally apply
to a pursuit undertaken by local police officers.172 Both of these
determinations apply the private person standard of the FTCA
by eschewing the statutory protections given to local officials.
It was at this point, however, that the court departed
from the private person standard of liability. The decision went
on to hold that the appropriate standard of care would be what
a reasonable police officer would do under the circumstances.173
In fact, the court concluded that expert testimony would be
necessary to determine the appropriate standard of care.174 If it
is inappropriate under Olson to determine what duty is owed to
a plaintiff by analogizing to local police, then it stands to
reason that looking to those same police to determine whether
or not the federal officers’ actions were reasonable would also

167

Id. at 145. The capitol police were in pursuit of the car because it had been
stolen during an armed carjacking earlier in the evening. Id. The passenger who was
injured was not aware that the car was stolen when she accepted a ride from the driver. Id.
168
Id. at 151-52.
169
Id. at 150.
170
Id. at 151. The government’s argument that this was not “a typical drive
through the streets of the city” is not without merit. Id. In fact, an analogy to a private
individual attempting to execute a citizen’s arrest would probably be more appropriate.
171
See id.
172
See Abney v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 1036, 1041 (D.C. 1990).
173
Lee, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 151-52, 154.
174
Id. at 154.
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be inappropriate.175 Nevertheless, when faced with the choice of
determining whether the appropriate standard of care was that
of a private citizen, such as a private security guard, or a public
employee, in this case a police officer, this court chose the
latter.176 The district court did not offer an explanation for its
departure from the private person analogy in this one area,177
and there is no provision of the FTCA stating that the private
person standard applies to determine the existence of a duty
but not what actions are reasonable under the circumstances.178
That is not to say that the decision in Lee was unjust. To
the contrary, by looking at what sort of conduct would be
reasonable for police officers, the court was able to take into
account the responsibility and additional training that these
federal officers possessed, as well as the considerations of overdeterrence that have shaped tort law as applied to local police
officers.179 The problem with this approach is not in its result,
but in its inconsistency with the private person requirement of
the FTCA under the plain language interpretation of Olson.
IV.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE
FTCA

For the reasons above, none of the judicial
interpretations of the FTCA post-Olson provide a truly viable
solution to the problem created by applying the private person
standard of the FTCA in the law enforcement context.
Moreover, because of the strict interpretation of the statutory
language that has been endorsed by the Supreme Court, it is
unlikely that any truly effective judicial alternative is
175

See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006) (stating that the United States is liable to the
same extent as a private individual without making a distinction between the various
elements of tort claims).
176
See Lee, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 154. Some courts acknowledged that this practice
was inappropriate even prior to Olson. See Ortiz v. U.S. Border Patrol, 39 F. Supp. 2d
1321, 1323 (D.N.M. 1999) (“Simply by using the phrase ‘private person[]’ [in the FTCA,]
Congress appears to have decided that federal employees are not to be compared to state
or local government employees, but to non-public-sector individuals.” (emphasis added)).
The reasoning the court uses in its decision to use a law enforcement standard of care
aligns quite closely with this note’s discussion supra Part II. See Lee, 570 F. Supp. 2d at
151-52. Judge Bates cites the challenges that police officers face in discharging their
duties, including taking risks that would not be appropriate for an ordinary person. Id.
(citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989)).
177
See Lee, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 151-52.
178
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674-2680 (2006).
179
See Lee, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 151-52 (discussing the difficulty in balancing
the need to apprehend suspects with the risks of pursuit).
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available. Therefore, the best solution is for Congress to amend
the statute to clarify the extent to which the United States
should be held liable when the actions of law enforcement
agents are at issue. This solution is not limited by the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the existing statute, so it could easily
address the shortcomings of the FTCA in this area. In addition,
while addressing the problems of the private person standard,
Congress should also consider the possibility that states may
choose to impose affirmative duties on their local law
enforcement officers, and consider modifying the wording of the
statute to allow plaintiffs to pursue constitutional tort claims
under the FTCA.
Finding a solution to the problems of the private person
standard of the FTCA is a fairly easy endeavor, and one that
several courts had adequately handled prior to Olson.180 The
simplest solution is to add language to the FTCA stating that,
although the United States is generally liable where a private
person would be, in cases involving the conduct of law
enforcement officers, the United States is liable to the same
extent as local law enforcement. Putting federal law enforcement
on the same footing as state actors is hardly a novel concept,181 but
such an amendment would ensure that the civil liability of the
United States for the actions of these agents is better aligned with
the unique characteristics of law enforcement officers and the
policy concerns that arise in that context.
However, analogizing federal agents to local law
enforcement officers does present a concern that Congress
should take into account when revising the FTCA. That is the
possibility that mirroring the liability of local law enforcement
could result in additional liability for the United States where
individual states have chosen to place affirmative duties on law
enforcement officers to aid the public.182 Moreover, the federal

180

See supra note 81.
As early as 1792, Congress ensured that marshals of the United States had
the same power in enforcing federal law that the law enforcement officers of the state had
in executing local laws. Act of May 2, 1792, § 9, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 265 (1792) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 564 (2006)). Granted, this act was passed at a time when the doctrine of
sovereign immunity barred any suit against the federal government, so civil liability was
not a concern. Nevertheless, the concept that federal officers should not be burdened to a
greater extent than state actors is equally applicable in the context of civil liability.
182
Some states have already chosen to do so. See, e.g., Praet v. Borough of
Sayreville, 527 A.2d 486, 488 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (“[T]he officers . . . were
under a duty by virtue of their employment to render emergency assistance to victims
of automobile accidents.”); Lee v. State, 490 P.2d 1206, 1209-10 (Ala. 1971) (holding
181
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government could lose the benefit of “Good Samaritan”
statutes, whereas under the private person standard the
government is able to take advantage of those benefits if its
officers undertake a rescue attempt.183 As mentioned previously,
accepting these additional duties might be desirable as a
matter of policy, but Congress should consider the issue when
crafting a legislative solution to the private person problem.
A final issue that should be considered by Congress in
any amendment to the FTCA in the law enforcement context is
the fact that, in its current state, constitutional tort claims are
unavailable under the FTCA.184 In some instances, the actions
of law enforcement officers might not be compensable under
state law, but the conduct could create liability under a theory
of constitutional tort. However, because constitutional torts are
not cognizable under the FTCA, the federal government is
shielded from liability for constitutional violations if those
violations do not fall within a specific state law tort.185 This is
contrary to the intent of the 1974 amendment to the FTCA;
namely, that the amendment would address both constitutional
and non-constitutional torts.186
An example of this scenario is Washington v. DEA.187 The
facts in Washington bear a remarkable similarity to the
Collinsville raids that prompted Congress to amend the FTCA
in 1974.188 In Washington, an agent of the DEA obtained a
that a policeman was under a duty to render aid to a child who was attacked by a
lioness at an amusement park).
183
See Ortiz v. U.S. Border Patrol, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1325 (D.N.M. 1999).
184
See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1994) (“[T]he United States simply
has not rendered itself liable under [28 U.S.C.] § 1346(b) for constitutional tort claims.”).
185
An action would still exist under Bivens, but, the argument goes, any
judgment rendered would be subject to the individual officer’s financial ability to
satisfy the judgment. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. This concern is
arguably unfounded because in many instances defendants are indemnified by the
United States anyway. See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens
Litigation and Its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV.
809, 811 n.2 (2010). Even still, many commentators argue that liability for
constitutional torts should generally lie with the federal government. See id.; Susan
Brandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289,
340-42 (1995) (noting the hurdles to compensation under Bivens, including qualified
immunity); William P. Kratzke, Some Recommendations Concerning Tort Liability of
Government and Its Employees for Torts and Constitutional Torts, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U.
1105, 1152-53 (1996).
186
See S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 3 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789,
2791 (“[T]he Committee’s amendment should not be viewed as limited to constitutional
tort situations . . . .” (emphasis added)).
187
Washington v. DEA, 183 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 1999).
188
See id. at 871-72. In addition, the Collinsville raids involved agents from
DALE, which was a precursor to the DEA. Drug Enforcement Administration: 1970-
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warrant to search the plaintiffs’ home based on information
received from a cooperator, but made no attempt to
independently corroborate that information.189 When acquiring
the warrant, the agent requested that it allow for nighttime
execution, but the magistrate judge did not grant the request.190
Nevertheless, at approximately 12:30 a.m., DEA agents
executed the warrant by breaking down the plaintiffs’ door
with a battering ram, entering the house with weapons drawn,
ordering the plaintiffs around at gunpoint, threatening them,
and shoving the husband.191 Plaintiffs, an elderly couple, were
not physically injured, but they did suffer emotional distress
and several items in their home were damaged.192 Even though
no evidence of illegal activity was found, the agents seized
firearms, ammunition, and personal papers.193
The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit based on several grounds,
including violations of the U.S. Constitution and FTCA claims
for assault, battery, and abuse of process.194 After holding that
the constitutional claims were invalid under the FTCA, the
court went on to analyze the FTCA claims based on state law.195
The court held that the agents could not be held liable for
assault or battery in this case because the force was not more
than reasonably necessary to ensure their safety during the
search.196 The result was that the government was not liable in
this case even though this conduct was particularly egregious.
This result is inconsistent with the intent of the 1974
amendment to the FTCA, because this is exactly the type of
scenario that Congress intended to make compensable when it
amended the statute.197 While it is debatable whether or not the
1975, at 6-7, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/
history/1970-1975.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2010) (charting the genealogy of the DEA).
Perhaps ironically, the same bill that created the DEA also amended the FTCA to
create the exception for intentional torts committed by federal law enforcement. See S.
REP. NO. 93-588, at 3 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789, 2791.
189
Washington, 183 F.3d at 871.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 871-72. It was disputed whether the agents knocked before breaking
down the door. Id.
192
Id. at 870-72.
193
Id. at 872. Moreover, the receipt for items seized that was given to the
plaintiffs at the scene did not include the ammunition or papers seized. Id.
194
Id.
195
Washington, 183 F.3d at 873-74.
196
Id. at 874. The court also held that there was not sufficient evidence to
support the abuse of process claim because there was no evidence of a collateral
purpose, which was a necessary element of that claim. Id. at 875.
197
See supra Part I.B.2.
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actions of the officers in Washington were reasonable for the
purposes of the assault claim, an analysis of search and seizure
under the federal constitution would extend beyond the use of
physical force on a person.198 Under a Fourth Amendment
analysis, the search could be a violation if it was unreasonable
for the agents to make a “no-knock” entry199 or to execute the
warrant at night.200 Therefore, looking beyond the problems
with the private party standard of liability, Congress could also
take the opportunity to address this issue.
For the foregoing reasons, the FTCA should be amended
to resolve the issues created by the private person standard by
aligning the liability of the United States with the liability of
local law enforcement. This could be accomplished by amending
28 U.S.C. § 2674 with wording similar to the following:
For any claim under this chapter based on the actions or omissions
of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States
Government, the United States shall be liable in the same manner
and to the same extent as a state or municipality under like
circumstances.201

The result would be a statute that would limit the liability of the
federal government to instances where the actions taken by its
law enforcement officers reaches the level of abuse, yet still
would provide officers with the necessary amount of discretion to
perform their responsibilities. While amending the FTCA to
address the private person problem, Congress should also
consider the possibility that this modification might create
additional positive duties and fashion the amendment
accordingly. In addition, this amendment would provide
198

See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (“The determination of the
standard of reasonableness . . . requires ‘balancing the need to search against the invasion
which the search entails.’” (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967))).
199
See United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 67-68 (1998) (explaining when
“no-knock” entries are justified).
200
See United States ex. rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 896, 897 (3d Cir.
1968) (“The time of a police search of an occupied family home may be a significant
factor in determining whether in a Fourth Amendment sense, the search is
unreasonable.”). This is particularly likely in this case because nighttime execution
was requested by the officers, but was not given by the magistrate judge. Washington,
183 F.3d at 871. It is also possible that in some states, an action could be brought based
on a theory of constitutional tort under the state constitution. Such an action would be
cognizable under the FTCA because it would be brought according to the law of the
state where the alleged wrongful act took place. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006).
201
Because the FTCA plays the dual role of abrogating immunity and defining
liability, see supra note 40 and accompanying text, it would also be necessary to add
similar modifications to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) to ensure that the jurisdictional
requirements align with the scope of liability.
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Congress with an opportunity to effect the true intent of the
1974 amendment and allow suits under a theory of
constitutional tort.
Only Congress possesses the ability to tailor the FTCA
to meet the unique challenges of defining the liability of the
United States under these circumstances. Congress may choose
to do so as suggested above, or through other means; however,
it should act to clarify this area of law.
V.

CONCLUSION

This note suggests that liability for law enforcement
actions under the FTCA should be determined with due
consideration both of the harms caused to individuals and of the
potential effects that liability could have on the enforcement of
the laws, which provides the order essential to our society. Tort
law at the state level is far more developed, and has evolved to
take both of these factors into account. For that reason, a
comparison to state actors seems to be an appropriate solution.
That being said, any approach to assessing liability in this
context—and the approach offered here is no exception—will still
present serious difficulties because of the policy concerns that
arise when balancing individual interests with societal interests.
Those difficulties will be compounded as the roles and methods of
law enforcement continue to evolve. However, it is important for
any solution to recognize that liability in the law enforcement
context cannot be handled in the same generalized way that is
used for other government functions. Until the FTCA is revised to
recognize these concerns, there will be significant drawbacks to
applying that statute to the conduct of law enforcement officers.
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